

INTELETYPE

CLASSIFICATION SECRET  
Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP78-04864A000200010006-2  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO. [ ] 25X1  
INFORMATION FROM [ ] 25X1  
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS

COUNTRY Yugoslavia-Cominform  
SUBJECT CRITICAL INDICATORS IN YUGOSLAV-COMINFORM  
PROPAGANDA: AN INTERIM REPORT

DATE OF INFORMATION 11 October 1950 -  
22 January 1951

HOW PUBLISHED Radio Broadcasts

DATE DIST. 7 February 1951

WHERE PUBLISHED

NO. OF PAGES 10

DATE PUBLISHED 11 October 1950 - 22 January 1951

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. [ ]

25X1A6C

LANGUAGE Several

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# SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Reported herewith are interim results of a continuing quantitative analysis, begun 11 October 1950, of Cominform and Yugoslav war-of-nerves propaganda.

The analysis has been undertaken in order (1) to detect any changes which suggest imminent Communist aggression, that is, to determine whether certain postulated indicators of war-expectation are suddenly and simultaneously stepped up by either antagonist to a level significantly higher than any previous level; (2) to provide background knowledge of types of changes which, not having been followed by military action, may in the future be discounted in predictive value; and (3) to throw light on the Yugoslav and Cominform use of propaganda for purposes other than psychological preparation for imminent war. Such purposes might include, for example, diversion of attention from another major theater of conflict.

The evidence on these three points is as follows:

1. During the period covered there has been no change great enough to suggest imminent aggression.
2. The quantitative peak in Satellite military charges against Tito which occurred during the summer of 1950 [ ] and a lesser peak in November 1950 were not accompanied by any radical sharpening of the qualitative character of the material. In specificity, especially, the charges fall far short of the maximum attainable. Quantitative peaks of this magnitude may be discounted in future interpretive evaluations.
3. The study provides some evidence bearing on the hypothesis that war-scares in the Balkans may be used by the Kremlin to divert attention from other major theaters of conflict. The timing of the summer high phase of Cominform anti-Tito propaganda, coinciding with the first two months of the Korean war, is consistent with such an interpretation. However, the November peak in this propaganda had already passed and Satellite military charges had returned to more or less normal levels when the December Communist offensive in Korea began, and emphasis on Albania in this November high phase suggests that it had more relevance to concern over the effect of Greek-Yugoslav rapprochement on Albania than to any diversionary tactic.
4. Charges that Albania was to be the victim of Yugoslav attacks have been rare in the Albanian Home Service. This avoidance suggests official Albanian belief that propaganda concerning a Yugoslav attack would be more likely to increase than to decrease the divisive tendencies in the country.

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A. INTRODUCTION: NATURE AND PURPOSE OF STUDY

This report seeks to provide basic information on the nature of the war-of-nerves propaganda broadcast by Yugoslavia and by her Satellite enemies with respect to indications of Soviet-Satellite policy and intentions. The bearing of the data on a possible intention to initiate overt aggression will be considered, as well as its relevance to other purposes, primarily psychological ones.

Although Radio Moscow continually charges the West with aggressive aspirations, it has by and large avoided detailed and concrete recitations of facts and figures such as the numbers, types, dispositions, strategy, location and equipment of the armed forces of the West. Condemnation by generalized charges has been the rule. On the other hand, the war-of-nerves propaganda broadcast by the Satellite radios departs from the Moscow pattern of broad charges of aggressive intentions by placing considerable stress on more concrete charges of actual military preparations for attack. Such charges are herein postulated to carry greater conviction and alarm than generalized statements do.

The more concrete charges comprise descriptions of:

- a. The construction of military installations (airfields, fortifications, etc.) and the increase of arms and munitions.
- b. The recruiting, training and strength of the armed forces.
- c. The disposition and operations of those forces.

B. ACTIVE PHASE, SUMMER 1950

Concurrently with the start of the Korean war, the Satellite radios initiated an extended campaign of stress on preparatory charges of the kind outlined above, a campaign which resulted in a good deal of concern about possible Soviet-directed action against Yugoslavia; reports were received that this war-of-nerves campaign caused considerable anxiety among Satellite populations.

These charges differed from the previous pattern of war-of-nerves charges in the following ways:

1. The quantity of charges sharply increased.
2. New charges, indicating propaganda initiative, were introduced in considerable number.
3. Operational charges of a threatening nature appeared more frequently, e.g., that General Von Kleist had been released to plan an attack against Albania, using U.S. troops to be shipped from the Middle East via Greece to Yugoslavia.
4. The detail and specificity of charges increased; that is, more names, places, numbers, and dates were used, indicating greater concentration of effort to be convincing on the part of the propagandist.
5. "News" items--with their stress on the immediate--were used as a vehicle for some of these charges, giving a sense of urgency and alarm to the reports.
6. The target of Yugoslav attack was named more often; whereas the "People's Democracies" had previously been cited as the object of attack, post-Korea propaganda focused its attention on a specific Satellite--Albania.

These shifts in the content of charges and in their beaming and manner of presentation combined last summer to indicate that Satellite propagandists were engaged in a distinct effort to create a state of psychological tension.

C. QUANTITATIVE PEAK, NOVEMBER 1950

The accompanying chart, which graphs the total number of military charges made by Satellite radios week by week, beginning 11 October, indicates a clear peak during late November. This phase occurred shortly after the Greek-Yugoslav rapprochement and the closing of the Albanian Legation in Belgrade; during the period President Truman submitted the Yugoslav aid bill to Congress. The peak includes a reflection of consider-

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
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SATELLITE WAR-OF-NERVES CHARGES AGAINST TITO

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able Satellite stress on the charge that Yugoslavia was about to initiate some sort of action against neighboring Albania. On the world front, the Chinese Communists initiated their first major offensive from the Manchurian border as Satellite war-of-nerves charges against Yugoslavia mounted to the high point.

Did the character of these charges warrant the conclusion that a serious effort was being made to disquiet Yugoslavia and indirectly those in the West? Did the nature of this campaign reveal a serious attempt to consolidate Satellite people behind their local regimes or seriously to prepare them for action? How does the pattern evidenced in that peak phase differ from more recent propaganda? An attempt is made to answer these questions in the following discussion. Emphasis is placed on the November peak because it is a completed phase: as the graph reveals, current attention, while fairly high, has not reached a comparable peak, and the direction of the present trend is indeterminate. The findings derived from the study of the November high phase will be most usable when they can be compared with a subsequent phase of comparable magnitude and duration to determine whether important shifts of emphasis and direction have occurred.

#### 1. Nature of November Peak

Although propaganda attacks against Yugoslavia increase considerably during late November and early December, reiteration of standard charges accounts for a large share of the volume. The high volume recorded in the peak weeks of 15 November to 11 December results in part from the 10 rebroadcasts--an exceptional number--of the virulent Popivoda speech\* made before the World Congress of Peace and by the rebroadcasting of a NOVA BORBA article which contained some of the most detailed charges yet made concerning Tito's alleged preparations for war.\*\* Also heavily emphasized in the last two weeks of the high phase were protests against violations of the Albanian and Bulgarian borders. These protests alone constituted almost 40% of all charges made during the last two weeks of the phase. Condemnation of U.S. aid to Tito, in application to the military aspects of that aid, increased the total of military charges also.\*\*\* No appreciable sharpening of tone occurred in the context of the aid question, however. As with Radio Moscow, primary emphasis was given to the charge that Tito was an American vassal and that his troops were part of the whole aggressive system erected by the warmongers.

On the assumption that charges of concrete military preparations by the Yugoslav Army constitute an especially alarming type of charge, such charges have been given special scrutiny. The findings are as follows:

a. Quantity: In absolute number, there was a great increase in these charges during the first part of the high period (8-27 November), and in ratio to other types of charges the proportion was almost double the average for the 12 weeks measured during 1950. Thus the first half of the upsurge period revealed a definite stress on the military-preparatory type of charge, as compared with the full range of war-of-nerves charges.

b. Character: However, when these charges of the peak period are compared in character with charges of the same type broadcast in preceding and succeeding weeks, no startling shifts toward more threatening charges are revealed. Concretely, the

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\* For an anti-Tito speech, very wide distribution was accorded this item by Radio Moscow--the widest in many months. The speech signaled the beginning of a trend in Soviet broadcasts concerning Tito. Since then a threefold stress has been given to the topic of Tito's military preparations, which now constitutes from one-third to one-half of all Moscow's attention to Tito.

\*\* This commentary contains one of the very rare Satellite allusions to the strategic objectives of the Titoites in their coming attack, alleged to be aimed across Satellite boundaries: "The Titoites in elaborating their plans are foreseeing a blitzkrieg a la Hitler and the quick disintegration of Bulgaria and Rumania, together with a lightning breakthrough to the Black Sea."

\*\*\* In addition to the usual speedier Satellite reaction, Satellite condemnation of American aid differed in two ways from Moscow's treatment of that event: (1) the line that U.S. food would be used for the Army alone was a less prominent theme in Satellite charges; (2) the whole subject of U.S. aid constituted a much smaller part, relatively, of all the propaganda against Tito in Satellite output. Moscow gave it huge emphasis relative to total comment on Tito; the Satellites did not.

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following elements do not receive markedly greater relative stress than in other weeks:

1. The degree to which American participation is brought into the charges.
2. The specificity of the charges, i.e., the tendency to give specific names, locations, numbers, and times in detailing military preparations.\*
3. The extent to which such preparations are said to be taking place on the frontier.

Moreover, the use of relatively new and unusual charges, though somewhat higher than in other weeks, does not by any means appear to represent a maximum effort. Extremely few of the charges under consideration appear to be broadcast in the form of news items, in conformity to the pattern evidenced over the whole period under survey.\*\*

In sum, notwithstanding some tendency to play up the more threatening characteristics of armed forces' preparations for aggression during these three weeks, the greater part of the charges consist of the reiteration of standardized phrases. During the propaganda offensive of summer 1950, the major impact was much less the function of a simple quantitative increase than of a shift toward more threatening and more original charges. In November, however, no extreme qualitative shift occurred.

## 2. Nature of Subsequent Material

Satellite charges of armed preparation for attack have again increased, both absolutely and relative to other charges, since Tito's speech to the Assembly calling for increased appropriations for defense. They have not, however, approached the high period of 8-27 November, nor has there been disproportionate stress on the operational aspects of these alleged preparations.

A considerable portion of the preparation charges made in the first three weeks of 1951 are explicitly or implicitly reactions to Tito's Assembly speech. The increase also reflects an increase in specific Yugoslav charges of Satellite military preparation. Before Yugoslav Army Day, 22 December, very few of the charges from Belgrade cited concrete Satellite army preparations.

## 3. Relevance to World Situation

In view of the coincidence of last summer's heightened charges with the beginning of the Korean war, a check was made to see if the most heavily emphasized elements in the November upsurge had any relationship to events on the world scene. It might, for example, have been considered good diversionary tactics to stimulate tension concerning Yugoslavia at a time when the West was concerned over the first Chinese Communist offensive in Korea.

The propaganda evidence here seems negative. The heavily played Popivoda speech and the NOVA BORBA article mentioned above were both broadcast in quantity well before the Chinese offensive started on 26 November. The first (and heavily emphasized) Bulgarian note protesting border violations was broadcast two days later, and three additional border violation notes (one each from Bulgaria, Albania, and Hungary) were all broadcast by 14 December. As the graph indicates, however, military charges against Tito drop off rapidly while these notes are being broadcast during the first half of December, just at the period of maximum dismay in the West over the Chinese advance. And although Satellite propagandists might have been expected to continue rebroadcasting these notes of protest during the last two weeks of December in order to sustain an appearance of Titoist militancy, it is then that charges of border violations reach the lowest ebb recorded during the period covered by this study.

Moreover, these broadcast charges were apparently not particularly intended to stir the fears of Yugoslav listeners, since out of the 377 charges contained in the broadcasts and rebroadcasts of these notes between 28 November and 18 December, constituting almost a third of all military charges made, only 23 were broadcast to Yugoslavia, and these in Macedonian.

Thus relatively more emphasis was given to border violation charges and less to armed preparations for war after the Chinese offensive began. This picture contrasts sharply with that at the beginning of the Korean war; at that time relatively more emphasis was devoted to the more alarming charges of concrete preparations of the armed forces for war and less to the customary and familiar charges of Yugoslav border violations.

\* In the first of the three weeks, the degree of specificity, reflecting the NOVA BORBA article, exceeded the normal range of variability markedly; this high level was not sustained in the following two weeks, however.

\*\*The use of the news item as a propaganda vehicle is considered significant not only because it commands attention but because news items, even in Communist propaganda, contain a flavor of currency absent in retrospective and reiterative commentary.

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#### 4. Relevance to Albania

If the peak phase recorded in late November seemed to have little relevance to the Chinese offensive in Korea, that phase was definitely characterized by an increasing number of charges that Albania was a potential object of Yugoslav attack.\*

Although Satellite propagandists freely charge that Tito intends aggression against the "New Democracies" collectively, Albania is by far the most frequently specified object of attack. Except in the implication of border violation charges, Satellite radios rarely cite the other Satellite states adjoining Yugoslavia--Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania\*\*--as objects of potential attack. Although its isolated position might be expected to center attention on Albania, it is surprising that the others are so neglected. Apparently Satellite propagandists do not really attempt, during the period covered by this study, to make a plausible case that Yugoslavia intends to attack Bulgaria, Hungary, or Rumania, but are content to generalize the threat to "the People's Democracies" or to "Yugoslavia's neighbors."

Of concern is the question of whether there has been any significantly increasing tendency to emphasize Albania as the target of Yugoslav attack.

Prior to the high phase of summer 1950, the most prominent scaremongering device used by Satellite transmitters was to charge the Yugoslavs with frontier violations and to publicize trials of alleged Yugoslav espionage and sabotage agents. These trials and frontier violations have been given intermittent attention by Satellite propagandists for several years, and so constitute a somewhat routine method of picturing Tito as endangering his neighbors.

Since 1 December two spy trials and two border violation notes, given fairly wide publicity by Satellite radios, particularly by the Albanian radio and particularly in home broadcasts, have served to focus attention on Albania as a recipient of Yugoslav action. If at that time Satellite broadcasters had desired to make a major pretext out of alleged violations of the Albanian border, wide repetition of Albania's protest note of 5 December might have been expected. This did not occur. The note was apparently broadcast twice only, both times in the Tirana home service. By way of contrast, the longer Bulgarian protest note broadcast only two days later was picked up and rebroadcast by Rumania, Albania, and Free Greece.

When references to trials of Titoite agents and frontier violations in Albania are subtracted from the total of charges of Yugoslav intent or preparation against that country, it becomes clear that there has been no increase in other war-of-nerves charges in this regard during January as against the weeks before the November high phase.

During the high phase there was a definite increase in the citation of Albania as a potential recipient of Yugoslav action. During that phase, Albania was for the first time since early October explicitly cited as the object of concrete Yugoslav Army preparations said to be under way. Since that time, however, the specification of Albania in connection with Army charges has all but disappeared from Satellite output, despite the continued emphasis on border charges and the Peskopi trial. Thus, though attention is high, it is of a routine character.

Concerning the audiences to which these allegations are beamed, a suggestive differentiation emerges from the examination of charges citing Albania as the object of Yugoslav war-of-nerves charges during those weeks in November when Albania was increasingly specified as the object of potential attack. Except in the case of border violation charges, Albania was specified only in Albanian and other Satellite broadcasts in Serbo-croat and in non-Albanian home broadcasts. No such statements were made in the Albanian home service.\*\*\*

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\* Charges of Greek participation in these attacks were freely alleged during this period, especially by the Free Greece radio, which sharply increased its charges of Yugoslav preparations against Albania during the week of 21-27 November. However, the recurrently more alarming tone of Free Greece--for example, its prediction of attack "within a matter of days"--was not characteristic of Satellite charges.

\*\* As between the three eastern neighbors of Yugoslavia, slightly greater emphasis seems to be given Bulgaria as a potential object of attack than to Hungary or Rumania, after border violation charges are discounted.

\*\*\* Albania was cited 119 times by all sources during this high period, 15 November to 11 December. Of this number 71 of the statements were made by Radio Tirana, but in Serbo-croat only.

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While the Albanian radio cited Albania in home broadcasts as an object of general Yugoslav hostility during this period, there seems to be a deliberate effort on the part of Radio Tirana to avoid broadcasting war-of-nerves charges to its own listeners.

#### D. POTENTIAL QUALITATIVE HIGH

A recent example of extreme military specificity illustrates how far short of the attainable qualitative high current broadcast military charges fall. A commentary disseminated by the Rumanian press service in Morse Code on 19 January 1951, but apparently not broadcast, after claiming that the West German Government is allowing the training of anti-Albanian spies and saboteurs in its territory, continues:

"Suspect troop movements are taking place in Yugoslavia in the frontier zone with Albania. An infantry division was thus removed from Trebinje and occupied positions in the Scadarsko Lake region, in the Podoritsa, Plav, and Gusinie directions. Advanced units of this division are established in Bindjia, Dinoshia, Zatrepehie, Golubovtsi, and Planitsa. The headquarters are in Martinichi, in the nearby (sic) of Danilovgrad town.

"An Alpine regiment was camped in Masline, Podgoritsa, in barracks recently constructed. Some units of this regiment are in Korita. The 19th division, which was formerly garrisoned in Knin town, was not included into the 6th military region, which is concerned with the operation sectors along the frontier with Albania, between Montenegro and Sanghiak.

"A division of Prishtina--Kosovo and Metohia--spread its troops along the Albanian frontier as well. The staff of a regiment of this division installed itself at Giakovitsa, and units of the mentioned regiment were sent to the frontier locality of Chial Morina.

"The armored car corps of Skoplje was strengthened with an armored car brigade from Sisak. Other units also occupied positions near the Albanian frontier.

"The movements of land troops are accompanied and supported by movements of air force units. Fighting plane regiment Number 113 was established in Skoplje. A bomber escadrille arrived in (name mission--Ed.) airdrome; another escadrille arrived in Chemovsko Polie airdrome. Meanwhile, the Alpine airports of Radovche, Brezna, and Berane, in the neighborhood of the Albanian frontier, are hastily accommodated and rehabilitated."

These charges are unique in their specificity, their detail, and their attention to named units engaged in tactical movements on the frontier of a specific neighboring state. Only once to date have Satellites even mentioned the number of a specific military unit, and that one was not said to be engaged in operational activities such as those described above. In talking about troops at the frontier, Satellite radios rarely specify even a given number of troops.

#### E. STRENGTH PROPAGANDA

One of the most direct ways in which Satellite propagandists might undertake to prepare their own peoples for war or to frighten Yugoslav audiences is to play up the armed strength, efficiency and preparedness of their own war machines. Although any direct and sustained vaunting of the military strength of his own country makes the broadcaster vulnerable to charges of militarism or even of warmongering, and may also give rise to fears on the part of one's own people that the regime contemplates war, the idea of the army's strength and capability in any potential crisis may to advantage be conveyed subtly by stressing the defensive role of the army, its peacefulness, and its oneness with the regime and the people, and by describing its more routine activities. When such material is broadcast to a potential enemy, it may serve to disquiet the listener.

Satellite radios place extremely little stress on their own strength. Somewhat fewer than 3% of the charges and claims that fall within the definition of war-of-nerves material as outlined are made up of military strength statements, even when military strength is defined very broadly. Moreover, most of those claims are quite indirect, and few of them are made in a context which deals explicitly with Tito and his alleged aggressiveness. As in the case of Soviet broadcasts, attention to strength is prominent mainly during the celebration of military anniversaries.

Of the 56 military strength statements tallied up to the end of 1950, only three were broadcast to Yugoslavia. The total number of strength statements has been even lower since the turn of the year. A policy of extreme avoidance of the subject in broadcasts to Yugoslavia is apparent.

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This extreme avoidance is observed also with respect to Satellite denials of Yugoslav charges. There are extremely few of these, fewer than one percent. Of denials of army preparations for attack there is practically a complete blackout. During the 12 weeks under measure in 1950, only one denial of any army charge occurred: during the third week in November, when Satellite charges against Tito were heavy, the Hungarian radio denied the charge that the Satellites were moving troops along the Yugoslav frontier. It is undoubtedly significant that the only Yugoslav charges concerning Satellite armies which has been denied during the first three weeks of 1951 is Tito's widely broadcast statement that those armies have exceeded the strength limitations imposed by the peace treaties. The number of repetitions of that denial, when compared with all denials made by Satellite transmitters over the whole period, is markedly large. These facts suggest considerable sensitivity on the question of their troop strength.

Expanded use of the strength theme might be expected in the event that Satellite propagandists were required to reassure their home audiences or to disquiet Yugoslav listeners. The beam distribution pattern of this theme may in the future provide clues to Satellite preparatory or diversionary psychological tactics.

#### F. WEAKNESS PROPAGANDA

If Satellite propagandists do not spend much time in discussing their own military strength, neither do they make a particular effort to play up claims of disaffection or weakness of Tito's Army. This low emphasis serves to avoid contradicting the picture so continuously drawn of an aggressive Yugoslav Army engaged in extensive preparations for attack. Most of the weakness charges are made only by implication, principally by discussing the resistance of the soldiery to Tito's control, and it is seldom plainly stated that the Army is weak or inefficient. The subject is also relatively avoided in the Satellite home services; four out of every five weakness claims are broadcast to Yugoslavia.

Two allied weakness claims conform to this pattern. One is the claim that Yugoslav youth are refusing to undergo military training, a theme which receives but little attention. The other is the claim that the people are directing their resistance against the military preparations of the Titoites by sabotage, slow-downs in the production of war goods, and the like. This theme, which receives somewhat less attention than more direct statements of resistance in the Army, had not at the end of the year received appreciably more attention than during the first weeks under measure. In the considerable attention devoted by Satellite radios to descriptions of allegedly widespread and growing resistance in general there seems to be no marked trend towards focusing discussion on internal resistance directed against the militarization of Yugoslavia.

#### G. SATELLITE REACTION

Claims of widespread resistance in the Yugoslav Army did not show an upward movement until Yugoslav Army Day on 22 December. Attention jumped noticeably, however, during the week after the Army Day speech and again for three weeks after Tito's military budget speech to the National Assembly on 28 December, which gave enormous attention to the actual and prospective strength of the Yugoslav Army. These two periods saw an appreciable increase in the use of the military weakness line: attention increases from the previous average of about 3% of all charges to about 10%. During the most recent week under survey, 16-22 January, emphasis began to decline, however.

It is of interest that concurrently with the increase in attention to weakness by Satellite radios Radio Moscow gave a very heavy stress to the same subject which persisted for one week only, however, before dropping off sharply. The Satellites and the USSR thus appear to have made something of an effort--primarily for the benefit of Yugoslav audiences\*--to counteract Tito's emphasis on his own strength during the last two weeks of 1950.

Considered broadly, however, there is certainly no evidence of a sharp rise in the subject of Yugoslav military disaffection and weakness either to Yugoslav audiences as a maneuver of intimidation or of diversion or to home audiences by way of reassurance. Any real stress in the output of Satellite radios to their own people on the topic of the military weakness of the Yugoslav Army would carry particular weight as an indicator of expected military action by virtue of the fact that it would tend to contradict the picture drawn of an aggressive Tito.

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\* None of the Soviet broadcasts on the subject were heard in Satellite languages.

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H. YUGOSLAV REACTION

Although in last summer's high phase the Yugoslav radio may almost be said to have traded charge for charge with the Cominform, its output during all of October and November and most of December was characterized by great restraint. The volume of charges was much lower than that of the Satellites; in one week only did Yugoslav charges, most of which concerned border violations, exceed Satellite charges. The more threatening army charges account for a smaller percentage of the total number of charges made than in the output of Satellite radios.

Restrained or at least delayed response is also reflected by a reversal of phase; the total number of Yugoslav charges goes gradually down and then up over the same period when Satellite charges go markedly up and then down. Even the number of denials voiced by Radio Belgrade--normally a sizeable part of Yugoslav war-of-nerves charges--does not increase as Satellite charges increase.\*

It is only after the conclusion of the November peak that Yugoslav charges mount; during the week of 12-18 December, before the celebration of Army Day, both charges and denials go up appreciably. But even then, charges and denials were both concentrated on border violation cases, one of the least inflammatory of the themes that could be used. Something of the restraint which still characterizes Yugoslav output is revealed by an incident on 21 January: the Belgrade radio, quoting TANYUG, reported that more than 100 planes flying from Bulgaria to Albania had crossed Yugoslav territory; later TANYUG withdrew the report, and the Home Service radio called it exaggerated and described the incident as an "ordinary violation."

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\* Belgrade has always emphasized denials of Satellite charges; the practice of Soviet and Satellite radios suggests that they consider this a poor propaganda technique.

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I. APPENDIX1. Definition of Indicators

Charges of armed forces' preparations for war: supplies, equipment, training, strength, operations. Such charges are considered to be of a more threatening nature because they focus--as Communist radios usually do not--on the military means to be used in implementing an aggressive intent.

Charges of psychological preparations for war: stirring up war hysteria, spreading news of troop movements, etc.

Charges of economic preparations for war: increasing the military budget, building war factories, etc.

Charges of border violations.

Claims of the military strength of the broadcaster: Army Day; morale, efficiency of the army, defensive capacity, warnings, etc.

Claims of the military weakness of the opponent: officers and men imprisoned, resistance to the army leadership, poor morale, etc.

Charges of para-military activities: militarization of youth, training spies, trying captured spies, guerrilla action, etc.

Charges of forming aggressive alliances: the Athens-Belgrade Axis, the Mediterranean Pact, joining NATO, etc.

Charges of aiming to overthrow the regime or to partition or annex the country, etc.

2. Definition of Sample

This study is based on voice broadcasts only. It includes items from press service transmissions such as TANYUG, AGERPRESS, ATA, etc., only when they are subsequently broadcast in voice.

The broadcasts systematically surveyed are as follows:

- a. The output of the Yugoslav and Satellite central home services. Coverage is almost complete, except for slight deficiencies in regard to Albania and Bulgaria. No regional services are included.
- b. Belgrade broadcasts to the six Satellites. Coverage, about 60%. No Russian-language broadcasts are included.
- c. The output of the six Satellites to Yugoslavia. Coverage, about 37%, none of which is Slovene.

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